The
Horn Of Africa: Perspectives On The Future Of The Somali
Jihad
Writers Articles And Opinions
19 November 2009
By Andrew
McGregor
For nearly a year now, the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) of Somalia has been waging a life or
death struggle for survival against the repeated
assaults of a radical Islamist opposition; an
opposition that remains unsatisfied with the
appointment of a fellow Islamist as president and the
implementation of Shari’a as the law of the land. Led
by the former leader of the Islamic Courts Union
(ICU), Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, the TFG has little
effective control over the country outside of a few
Mogadishu neighborhoods, despite backing from the
United States, the United Nations and the African
Union (AU). Members of the TFG work under the constant
threat of assassination, keeping many parliamentarians
outside of the country. The Islamist militants
demonstrated their reach in a bombing that killed the
Minister of Security, Colonel Umar Hashi Adan, in
Hiraan province last June (al-Jazeera [Doha], June 19;
al-Arabiya [Dubai], June 18). Possible directions for
the future of the Islamist insurgency in Somalia are
offered below.
Leadership of Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen
The leadership of Somalia’s Harakat al-Shabaab
Mujahideen (Youth Mujahideen Movement) appears to be
in a state of flux at the moment. The movement’s
reclusive leader, Shaykh Ahmad Abdi Godane “Abu Zubayr”
(a.k.a. Ahmad Abdi Aw Muhammad, a.k.a Shaykh Mukhtar
“Abu Zubayr”), was seriously wounded in May when a
suicide bomb went off prematurely in a safe house
where an al-Shabaab meeting was being held (Garowe
Online, May 18, May 20; Waagacusub.com, May 18).
Little has been heard of him since. Only days after
the blast, the public face of the movement, Shaykh
Mukhtar Robow “Abu Mansur,” was replaced by Shaykh Ali
Mahmud Raage (a.k.a. Shaykh Ali Dheere) (Radio Simba,
May 21; Shabelle Media Network, May 22). No
explanation was offered for the sudden change and
Mukhtar Robow briefly faded from public view before
reappearing with a statement threatening the
administrations of semi-autonomous Puntland and
Somaliland, a self-declared independent state (AllPuntland.com,
October 31). He was then reported to have appeared at
an anti-Israel demonstration in Baydhabo, where he
announced that there would be a hunt for anyone who
holds Israeli citizenship or who might be Jewish (Puntland
Post, October 31). Though there are no public signs of
enmity, there is always the possibility that Godane’s
death or prolonged incapacitation could set off a
power struggle within the Shabaab leadership.
Factionalism in the Islamist Opposition
The Hizb al-Islam movement, led by Shaykh Dahir Aweys,
is the successor to Shaykh Aweys’ earlier
organization, the Eritrean-based Alliance for the
Re-liberation of Somalia – Asmara (ARS-Asmara). While
Hizb al-Islam is larger than al-Shabaab, the latter is
better organized and possibly better equipped. At the
moment, Hizb al-Islam operates as an ally of al-Shabaab
in the fighting in Mogadishu, though there are
differences between the two groups that could erupt
into open warfare at any moment. There have already
been skirmishes between the groups.
Al-Shabaab’s Salafist orientation has brought it into
conflict with Somalia’s Sufis, who have responded to
the desecration and destruction of their shrines and
places of pilgrimage by forming their own formidable
militia, the Ahlu Sunnah wa’l-Jama’a. With Sufis
rather than Salafists representing mainstream Islam in
Somalia, al-Shabaab has created a determined enemy
that is unlikely to cease fighting until the radical
Islamists have been defeated.
Internationalization of the Somalia Conflict
Reflecting its narrow vision of what constitutes
righteous rule, al-Shabaab has, in the last year,
threatened all of its neighbors as well as Burundi,
Uganda, Ghana, Israel and the United States. The
conflict already has an international element, with
Ugandan and Burundian troops of the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deeply involved in the
active defense of the TFG, Ethiopian troops conducting
cross-border incursions after a lengthy and costly
occupation of Somalia, and U.S. airstrikes being
launched on terrorist targets. The TFG has also issued
appeals for neighboring countries, including Kenya,
Djibouti and Yemen, to send troops to Somalia to
bolster the government (al-Jazeera, June 22). It is
clear that the TFG has little local support it can
rely on and would quickly collapse without
international backing.
Al-Shabaab is active in fundraising and recruitment of
Somali diaspora groups in Sweden, the UK, the
Netherlands, Canada and the United States (NRC
Handelsblad, November 13). While these activities have
not yet escalated to politically-motivated violence,
the possibility exists, particularly as al-Shabaab
becomes more vocal in its threats to Western states.
The recent arrest of three Somali men accused of
targeting a military installation in Australia with a
suicide attack has alarmed other nations hosting large
Somali communities (Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, August 7).
Al-Shabaab has pledged retaliation against the United
States in response to the mid-September airstrike that
killed al-Qaeda suspect Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan (Daily
Nation [Nairobi], October 8). Though direct
retaliation is probably beyond the means of al-Shabaab,
it is entirely possible that its agents in the
American diaspora could arrange some kind of internal
attack by young people sympathetic to the Islamist
cause in Somalia. Al-Shabaab leader Shaykh Abdi Ahmad
Godane has made clear the international ambitions of
the movement: “We will fight and the wars will not end
until Islamic Shari’a is implemented in all continents
in the world and until Muslims liberate Jerusalem…” (AFP,
May 13). For the moment these goals may exceed the
grasp of a movement that has yet to take Mogadishu.
What
Will Happen in Somalia in the Event of a Shabaab
Victory?
• Popular support for the movement (which is difficult
to gauge but certainly does not include a majority of
Somalis) would inevitably diminish due to the
movement’s ordinances against popular pastimes such as
watching soccer or chewing qat, as well as the
movement’s affection for hudud punishments for
violations of Shari’a, such as stonings, amputations,
beheadings and whippings. Though Shari’a law has
already been implemented in Somalia, al-Shabaab is
only interested in its own interpretation, one not
shared by a majority of Somalis.
• Shabaab’s foreign connections will work against
them. Shabaab’s international ties are all with
non-state actors, none of which will be of any
assistance in running a state. On the contrary, these
ties will invite embargoes and other sanctions.
International isolation and the suspension of
humanitarian aid are likely outcomes for an
organization which has referred to UN aid agencies as
“enemies of Islam.”
• The movement’s revanchist program to establish a
“Greater Somalia” places it immediately at odds with
every one of Somalia’s neighbors. Any attempt to
expand Somalia’s borders as part of the development of
an Islamic Caliphate in the Horn of Africa would
require full national support, in the absence of which
disaster would surely befall the movement and the
nation. Al-Shabaab’s revanchism would quickly mobilize
regional opposition.
• Civil war with Puntland and Somaliland would quickly
follow an al-Shabaab victory in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab
terrorist attacks on autonomous Puntland and
self-declared independent Somaliland have already
introduced political violence into these pockets of
Somali stability. Shabaab’s declared intention is to
bring both regions under the control of an Islamist
caliphate, a program with almost no popular support in
these two regions. With Puntland and Somaliland
already embroiled in a bitter and occasionally violent
border territorial dispute, the possibility of a
three-sided civil war exists.
• Continued fighting with Ahlu wa’l Jama’a would be a
near certainty with al-Shabaab hardliners appearing to
have won the internal debate over the wisdom of
deliberately antagonizing Somalia’s vast Sufi
community through the continued destruction and
desecration of Sufi shrines, graves and places of
pilgrimage.
• Though al-Shabaab has cooperated with Shaykh Hassan
Dahir Aweys’ Hizb al-Islam militia on the Mogadishu
battleground, the Shabaab leadership has serious
differences with the ambitious Shaykh Aweys and would
likely prefer to exclude him from any Islamist
administration. If Shaykh Aweys could keep his
fighters from going over to al-Shabaab, further
intra-Islamist fighting could be expected.
• Having very little influence with Somalia’s tribal
elders, the movement has little expectation of
resolving existing clan disputes or preventing the
eruption of new ones, leaving little hope that the
movement could impose stability without a massive
increase in violence.
• Without a core of technical experts or experienced
administrators, the inability of al-Shabaab to carry
out the basic administrative functions of a national
government would inevitably lead to the collapse of
the regime, leaving Somalia in perhaps an irreparable
state.
• The return of Ethiopia’s military would be a real
possibility. The rise of Islamist forces in Somalia is
likely to increase ethnic-Somali resistance to
Ethiopian rule in the Ogaden region. If Addis Ababa
has a choice between fighting the war in Somalia or
their own in eastern Ogaden province, it will choose
Somalia, especially if further U.S. arms and training
are made available. The United States would like to
act through a proxy in Somalia rather than open a new
front in the War on Terrorism through direct military
intervention.
• The possible effect of an al-Shabaab victory on the
piracy situation is difficult to gauge. In the past
al-Shabaab has expressed its opposition to piracy,
even attacking a party of pirates at one point, though
this was just as likely to be inspired by clan
rivalries or a dispute over distribution of ransom
money. Since most pirate activity emanates from
Puntland, an al-Shabaab victory in Mogadishu might
have little impact unless the movement acts to invade
Puntland and end its semi-autonomous status. This
would bring al-Shabaab into direct contact with the
armed forces of neighboring Somaliland and an almost
inevitable confrontation that would stretch al-Shabaab’s
supply lines and capabilities in a region where they
have little influence.
• An al-Shabaab victory would represent a major blow
to African Union (AU) peacekeeping efforts. The AU
mission to Darfur could be described as having a mixed
record at best – in Somalia it has only been through
the commitment of Uganda that AMISOM has survived.
Though the mission has been bolstered by the addition
of Burundian troops, it is still severely undermanned
and subject to greater stress than ever since the
AMISOM mandate was changed to provide for military
action against the insurgents in Mogadishu. In the
event of a TFG collapse, AMISOM troops and equipment
(including artillery and armor) would have to be
quickly evacuated, a capability the AU does not
possess. With little peace to keep, the AU
peacekeepers face daily combat losses and are subject
to suicide bombings even in their own camps, such as
the one that killed 17 Ugandan and Burundian soldiers
on September 17, including the mission’s second in
command, Major General Juvenal Niyoyunguruza of
Burundi. The attack was retaliation for the U.S.
airstrike that killed al-Qaeda operative Saleh Ali
Saleh Nabhan (New Vision [Kampala], September 17;
Daily Nation [Nairobi], September 18). ).
• An al-Shabaab victory would present jihadis in other
theaters with a temporary morale boost, but a large
scale movement of jihadis to Somalia is still
unlikely. Somali clannishness and factionalism are
anathema to hardcore jihadis, who are in the habit of
placing organizational needs and group identity over
personal or tribal needs and identities. Lack of
infrastructure and modern communications will inhibit
rather than enhance international operations based in
Somalia. The prevailing xenophobia of many Somalis
does not offer the same sort of welcome and refuge
al-Qaeda found in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and
northwest Pakistan. Southern Somalia also offers a
possible trap for global jihadis, as seen from the
experience of the ICU in December 2006, when Ethiopian
troops on land and U.S. ships at sea squeezed the ICU
fighters towards a reinforced Kenyan border. Getting
out of Somalia could be much harder than getting in if
an international effort is mobilized against al-Shabaab.
• A mass exodus of Somali civilians would surely
follow an al-Shabaab victory, leading to a further
humanitarian crisis that might require international
intervention. Already parts of Mogadishu have been
largely depopulated and Somali refugees make desperate
attempts to reach Yemen daily on craft that are barely
seaworthy. With most land borders closed to refugees,
smuggling people out of Somalia has become one of the
few growth industries in Puntland, the closest point
to Yemen.
• In the event of an al-Shabaab victory, the movement
may ironically rely on Somali factionalism for its
survival. Much the same way as the TFG only survives
due to the inability of the Islamist opposition to
unite effectively, al-Shabaab could survive for an
extended time because of the inability of the
anti-Islamist opposition to unite.
Conclusion
Despite international support, the TFG of President
Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad appears to have little
chance of survival. Almost continuous pressure from
the armed Islamist opposition threatens to undermine
the current administration, sending it to the same
fate as the failed administrations of former President
Abdullahi Yusuf and the earlier Transitional National
Government (TNG) of Abdiqasam Salad Hassan. With
little hope of relief from the apparently incessant
warfare in south and central Somalia, there are signs
that further attempts will be made to carve out
independent, locally-ruled mini-states along the lines
of Puntland and Somaliland. Combined with the
entrenchment of clan rivalries and interference from
neighboring states, regional interests and
international powers, prospects for the establishment
of a united Somalia at peace with its neighbors are
disappointingly slim.
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